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In this paper, we present a model of changes in electricity price returns in the context 
of interconnected electricity markets. This model predicts an inverse relationship 
between the increase in interconnection capacity and the volatility of price returns in 
the corresponding electricity markets. This means that an increase of interconnection 
between two markets leads to a decrease in the volatility of their prices. We support 
our model with empirical results from the Australian, European and USA electricity 
markets. The results suggest that this inverse relationship between interconnection 
and volatility exists, meaning that when markets tend to be physically interconnected, 
variance tends to be reduced. 
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In recent years, the growth of electricity markets has presented new challenges to engineers 
and economists. A growing number of interconnected electricity markets with different 
structures, regulations and players has emerged all over the world. The main product in 
these markets is electric energy, and the need to hedge against price risk, in this new 
environment, has drawn the attention of professionals and academics to the evolution of 
prices and the features behind them. 
 
As noted by Carr and Wu (2003) among others, a good knowledge of the price process is 
essential in the evaluation of any derivative - such as an option to buy or sell electricity -, in 
order to provide adequate risk hedging solutions. Although the Black and Scholes (1973) 
classic model continues to be widely used in option pricing, several authors have pointed 
out some problems in the model, especially when applied to energy derivatives. As an 
example, Carr and Wu (2004) emphasize three motives assumptions in the Black-Scholes 
model that make it inadequate to power options: the Geometric Brownian Motion 
assumption, the assumption of continuity in the price process, and the assumption of 
normality in the probability distributions. In addition, the volatility itself seems stochastic, 
and there is evidence of correlation between returns and volatility. 
 
Interconnected electricity systems exist all over the world. In Europe, a single synchronized 
system spans from Portugal to Bulgaria. However, the level of interconnection, i.e. transfer 
of power capacity, is very small in some regions, resulting in bottlenecks, while in others it 
is very high, smoothing the process of power capacity flow, with expected price impact. 
Therefore we hypothesize that physical market interconnection may play a significant role 
when modeling price returns volatility. The aim of this work is to show that besides simple 
arbitrage benefits when exploiting adjacent market price differences, increase in the 
interconnection level has a significant impact in terms of price risk. We suspect that the 
increase of transfer of power capacity will lower the volatility of electricity prices. If this is 
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so, our results will perform an important role when pricing risk management instruments 
like power options. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. In section two we present some electricity price 
characteristics and explain the impact of market interconnections. In section three we 
present our model and in section four we present the database. We finish the document by 






2. ELECTRICITY PRICES AND ELECTRICITY MARKETS 
CHARACTERISTICS  
 
Several authors have analyzed the behavior of electricity prices. Among others, Nogales et 
al. (2002) identify the most important characteristics as high frequency of data 
observations, non-constant mean and variance along time, multiple seasonality (daily, 
weekly and annual), high price volatility; and the presence of jumps in the price process. 
 
We can observe these characteristics in most electricity markets. High frequency refers to 
typical daily variations, for instance, from 14 to 35 €/MWh, a 150% variation. In most 
commodities, this daily price variation would be inconsistent, which is not the case in the 
electricity markets, because of the non-storability of electricity. This large variation in 
prices translates into a large volatility. As noted by Huisman and Mahieu (2003), it is usual 
to observe daily volatilities of 29% in electricity markets compared to typical 20% annual 
volatilities in other financial products.  
 
We can explain seasonality by structural changes in supply and demand. Supply is usually 
dependent on hydro resources, which depend on climate changes that also affect the 
demand. The occurrence of unpredictable events, such as an outage, or sudden abnormal 
temperature changes explains the presence of jumps or spikes in prices. 
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Knowledge of the features that have an impact on the formation of electricity prices is 
crucial in the definition of an adequate price process.  
 
The price of electricity should have a positive correlation with consumption due to 
increasing marginal costs of production. Therefore, as the load increases, the price is also 
likely to increase, and the presence of daily, weekly, and seasonal patterns is expected. Li 
and Flynn (2004) study those patterns and present evidence that there are different degrees 
of correlation between electricity price and consumption and different kinds of patterns 
from market to market. 
 
Apart from those regions where natural barriers like seas or oceans are present, electricity 
systems tend to be interconnected all over the world. In Europe, for instance, a single 
synchronized system spans from Portugal to Bulgaria. In spite of that, the level of 
interconnection, i.e. physical transfer of power capacity, is quite small in some regions, 
resulting in bottlenecks. These are expected to have an impact in price smoothing when 
analyzing adjacent market price formations. The objective of this paper is to show how 
changes in interconnection levels have an impact on price behavior, namely in terms of 
price risk. More objectively, we argue that an increase in power transfer capacity will lower 
the volatility of electricity prices. 
 
This is critical when pricing risk management contracts like options. For example, we may 
expect a decrease in the price of an energy derivative (call or put option) in one market as 
the level of interconnection with other markets increases. Transmission lines are the only 
possible means to exercise arbitrage in real time but, as they are physical systems, they are 
subject to failure and maintenance periods, on top of physical restrictions that theoretical 
models usually assume not to exist. As a result, reinforcements of existing lines as well as 
the construction of new lines can also change the level of interconnection with immediate 
impact on price volatility.  
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Figure 1 – Example of setting up an interconnection between electricity markets. 
 
Figure 1 shows what is supposed to happen when a new link is constructed between two 
separate markets. When markets are completely distinct, instant arbitrage mechanisms are 
not possible in the spot markets of both regions. However, as soon as we link them and as 
soon as we let the price mechanisms flow between, them prices will tend to converge, 
limited by the physical capacities opened by the linkage mechanism. 
 
 
3. MODELLING CHANGES IN ELECTRICITY PRICES IN INTERCONNECTED 
MARKETS  
 
3.1. Modelling Price Returns 
 
In market economies, electricity price is governed by the match of supply and demand and, 
as in any other markets, it is plausible to assume that the price returns show a finite average 
and variance.  
 
The existence of an interconnection promotes arbitrage possibilities between 
interconnected markets. Therefore, as the level of interconnection between different 
electricity markets increases, their price returns will tend to converge. This is shown by 
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Figure 1, which illustrates when a new link is built between two markets that were 
previously segregated (time zero). At time one, we could devise two possibilities: without 
the interconnection prices would remain the same; with the interconnection, i.e. after the 
link was established, and assuming that the link was strong enough to not impose any 
power transfer constraint, prices would converge.  
 
That is, the interconnection between electricity markets favors arbitrage. Therefore, the 
differences in prices in the second instant (t = 1) will tend to zero, depending on transaction 
costs and power transfer capacity. Nevertheless, even assuming that the flow mechanism 
was slowed down by some strangulation on power transference capacity, or given 
imperfect markets as a result of transaction costs, the increase of interconnection should 
always support an increase in price returns correlation. Li and Flynn (2004) showed that in 
deregulated electricity markets that are close and connected by transmission lines, prices 
tend to equalize. 
 
 
Figure 2 – Two examples of prices evolution with and without interconnection. 
As shown in Figure 2, we will assume that price differences between two markets that 
became interconnected will always become smaller than if they were kept unconnected. Let 
AP  and BP  stand for the electricity price in market A and B respectively, assuming that A 
and B are not connected, while 
*
AP  and 
*
BP  will stand for the electricity price in both 
markets after an interconnection has been established.  
 
We start by assuming that: 
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Assumption I – after an interconnection is established, prices in different markets 
will always be closer than they would be without the interconnection, whatever the 
change in the price: 
 






A PPPP     eq. 1 
 
Next, we define price returns as the result of price comparison following the assumptions 
established by equation 1 (please refer to Figure 2 also). The dotted lines in Figure 2 are 
associated with price changes, assuming that an interconnection between markets was 
established, while the continuous lines are associated with price changes in the absence of 
any interconnection. If, in market A, electricity prices start at level 
0t
AP  at time 0, they can 
become either the new level 
1*, t
AP  if an interconnection is established, or the new level 
1t
AP  if an interconnection is not established. Therefore, we would consider two price 
returns for each market, starting at a single price level in each market and reaching one of 
two different price levels per market as a result of establishing an interconnection between 
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After defining the price returns formulas in equations 3 and 4, and as a result of the 
assumption given by equation 1 (that is, prices in different markets will tend to converge 
after an interconnection is established) we will move to raise a second assumption: 
 


































    eq. 4 
 
The simultaneous equations model presented in equation 5 is subject to the following 
constraints: a) initial prices have to differ from zero; b) 10   and 10   ; c) 
1  . This set of constraints prevents the model from providing an inversion in the 
magnitude of prices at time 1 (t = 1), allowing any possible adjustment combinations in 
prices. 
 
As a consequence of assumptions I and II we may now establish corollaries I and II. 
 
Corollary I: The absence of interconnection ( 00   ) keeps price returns 
unchanged: 
























Corollary II: When an interconnection is established with no visible restrictions of power 
transfer capacity, or consumption tax differentials between markets ( 1  ), price 
returns will tend to converge to the same level. This would mean that no barriers or 
constraints would exist and that arbitrage arguments would hold fully. 
 
If 1   => 1*,1*,   tB
t
A pp . 
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Assuming that  1 , and replacing   in equation 5, it becomes 1*,1*,   tB
t
A pp . 
 
 
4. DATA  
 
The data used in this paper consist of a series of daily average prices and consumptions of 
electricity as defined in Table 1.  
 
Table 1 - Outline of the data series of daily average prices and consumptions of electricity. 
Group Market Sampling Period 
Australian SA (South Australian) 12-13-1998 to 12-31-2002 
 SNOWY (Snowy Mountains)  
 NSW (New South Wales)  
 QLD (Queensland)  
 VIC (Victoria)  
European LPX (Leipzig Power Exchange) 06-16-2000 to 02-28-2001 
 APX (Amsterdam Power Exchange)  
 NordPool (Nordic Power Exchange)  
 UK  
 OMEL  
USA/Canada Canada 05-01-1999 to 12-28-2000 
 Northern California  
 Southern California  
 PJM  
 NEPOOL  
 
 
The Australian data series contains daily electricity prices and volumes from 12-13-1998 to 
12-31-2002 that is, 1480 consecutive days. This allowed us to estimate 1473 weekly 
returns, which corresponds to approximately 4 years of data. The Australian electricity 
markets present an excellent variability of price return correlations, from 0.0889 to 0.9657. 
This shows a diversity of interconnection level between each market. The European data 
series span from 06-16-2000 to 02-28-2001. This is a smaller interval consisting of 258 
consecutive days, 251 weekly returns. Finally, for the USA and Canada electricity markets 
we considered the period between 05-01-1999 and 12-28-2000. This interval contains 608 
days and allows the calculation of 601 weekly returns.  
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Daily electricity average prices and daily electricity consumptions were provided by Ying 




5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
The methodology used in this paper consists of a cross-section estimation of the 
relationship between joint volatility and the correlation of price returns. We also used some 
control variables as described in 5.1. Although it is not possible to have a physical measure 
of electricity markets, we assume that electricity price returns correlation is good proxy 
indicator for the interconnection level. Therefore, in conjunction with equation 6, we 
expect an inverse relationship between the price returns correlation and conjunct volatility. 
That is, as markets become more interconnected, we expect an increase in electricity price 
correlation and a decrease in conjunct volatility. 
 
 
5.1. The Estimation Model 
 
We tested two different estimation models. The first model is given by equation 6, where 
we regress the joint volatility of price returns for two different markets i and j  
ji pp
   
against the correlation of price returns  
ji pp ,
 , the correlation of consumption logarithmic 
differences  
ji CC ,
 , the joint volatility of consumption logarithmic differences  
 
ji CC
   and the joint normalized average transaction volumes  ji CC  . This model 
only considers a single period.   
     jiccCCpppp CCaaaaa jijijiji  43210  eq. 5 
 
The second model is given by equation 7. It additionally considers the day of the week 
and so on.  





















 eq. 6 
 
We set up three groups of electricity markets (Australian, European and USA/Canada). 





We present the results in Tables 2 and 3, using the estimations model given by equations 6 
and 7. As expected, and in support of our hypothesis derived from Theorem I, 1a and 1b  are 
negative in all the cases. That is, when joint volatility among markets increases, the 
correlation among electricity price returns tends to decrease. The p-value is below 0.05 for 
the European and Australian markets, showing that we can reject the null hypothesis for a 
zero coefficient at 5% significance level. In the USA and Canada, 1a and 1b  are negative, 
but they are statistically insignificant. This may be partly explained by the weak direct 
physical interconnection between the California electricity markets and the east coast US 
markets. However, when we drop the variables that correspond to the least significant 
coefficients in equation 7 ( 2b , 3b , 4b  and 5b ) and rerun the regression equation on the same 
data, the coefficient 1b  becomes statistically significant at a 10% confidence level. The 
same happens when equation 7 is applied to the European data. When we drop the variable 
that corresponds to the least significant coefficient in equation 7 ( 2b ) and rerun the 
regression equation on the same data, the coefficient 1b  becomes statistically significant at 
a 5% confidence level. 
 
Table 2 - Estimation results: model equation (6)  
 Australian European USA 
Coefficient Value p-value Value p-value Value p-value 
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a1 -0.2713 0.0005 -0.2814 0.0033 -0.3049 0.6014 
a2 0.0640 0.3312 0.0027 0.9742 0.1980 0.7295 
a3 -0.1572 0.0775 -0.4128 0.0307 -1.6333 0.6129 




Table 3 - Estimation results: model equation (7) 
 Australian European USA 
Coefficient Value p-value Value p-value Value p-value 
b0 1.2620 0.0000 0.5810 0.0000 0.8287 0.0000 
b1 -0.2860 0.0000 -0.1286
*
 0.0548  -0.0660
**
 0.5891 
b2 0.0778 0.1130 0.1599 0.0584 -0.0588 0.6104 
b3 -0.1242 0.0353 -0.4655 0.0058 -1.0836 0.2552 
b4 -0.1674 0.0005 -0.4314 0.0000 0.0552 0.6261 
b5 -0.0817 0.0158 0.0692 0.0275 0.0591 0.4735 
b6 0.2556 0.0000 0.3634 0.0000 0.6190 0.0000 
b7 0.1393 0.0001 0.2219 0.0000 0.4742 0.0000 
b8 0.1726 0.0000 0.2114 0.0000 0.2718 0.0013 
b9 0.2764 0.0000 0.2088 0.0000 0.3187 0.0003 
b10 -0.1675 0.0000 0.1613 0.0000 0.3212 0.0003 
* If we remove the least significant coefficient (b2), we can reject the hypothesis of b1 being zero at the 
5% significance level. 
** If we remove the least significant coefficients (b2, b3 b4 b5), we can reject the hypothesis of b1 being 
zero at the 10% significance level. 
 
In general, our results validate the model predictions in the volatility behavior. It is 
interesting to note that the values of parameters 4a and 4b  are also statistically significant 
in the European and Australian electricity markets. Their negative values show that there 
seems to be an inverse relationship between the volume of transactions and price volatility. 
In this way, we can expect a decrease in volatility of electricity prices as the volume of 
transaction in the spot market increases.  
 
The weekday effect is also important to explain the volatility of electricity prices. We can 
see that in general parameter 6b  (Monday) is positive and higher than the other weekday 
coefficients. This shows that we can expect a higher volatility on Mondays than other 
weekdays.  







This paper provides a model of electricity price returns in the context of interconnected 
markets, based on the idea that interconnection is the best real time arbitrage mechanism 
between prices in different electricity markets. The model predicts, in general, an inverse 
relationship between electricity price volatility and the level of interconnection. Therefore, 
as the capacity of interconnection between markets increases, we can expect a decrease in 
their joint price volatility.  
 
An empirical analysis in the Australian, European and USA / Canada electricity markets 
reveals some evidence of an inverse relationship between the interconnection level and the 
joint volatility of prices. We used the correlation of prices between markets as an indicator 
of the interconnection level. This is in part a limitation in our empirical research, because 
other factors – not only the interconnection level – contribute to an increase in correlation. 
A possible way to overcome this indirect measure for physical interconnection could be the 
direct measure of the transmission lines and their electricity flows between markets. 
However, we had no access to this kind of information. 
 
This line of research presents new and exciting problems and is a natural ground for new 
studies that will help us to understand electricity markets and their price formation. In 
future works it will be important to examine the impact of other variables on volatility, 
such as the generation capacity, the generation mix, the regulations and market structures, 
and other constraints that may impact electricity prices. Another important aspect is the 
dynamic nature of interconnections and transmission systems in general. In electrical 
power systems, there is a lot of research about the dynamic safety of the transmission 
system. The system must sustain some production outages and line failures without 
collapsing. Therefore, we need to operate the system outside a certain distance from such a 
point of collapse. This issue may well be extended to future electricity prices research. 
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Considering constant prices in (t=0), the joint volatility of price without interconnection is 
given by (A1). 
A B
t 1 t 1
p p A B




In the same way (A2) gives the joint volatility of prices with interconnection. 
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If we consider the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality: 
COV(X;Y) V(X)V(Y)  (A3) 
 
We can change (A2) into the following inequality: 
   
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p p A B
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If we consider similar volatilities in both electricity markets, i.e. V(RpA) = V(RpB) = V(Rp), 
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This result means that just the interconnection can provide a decrease in joint volatility, up 
to 25%, because (a+b+2c) is in the interval [1.5; 2.0]. 
